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We examine and discuss the seed accelerator phenomenon which has recently received much attention 
both in the US and across the globe. While accelerators appear to be proliferating quickly, little is known 
regarding the value of these programs; how to define accelerator programs; the differences between 
accelerators, incubators, angel investors and co-working environments; and the importance of the various 
aspects of these programs to the ultimate success of their graduates, the local entrepreneurship ecosystems 
and the broader U.S. economy. This paper aims to fill this gap. 
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Accelerators are a rapidly growing phenomenon. The first accelerator, Y Combinator, was 
founded by Paul Graham in 2005 in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and soon moved and established 
itself in Silicon Valley. In 2007, David Cohen and Brad Feld, two start-up investors, set up 
TechStars in Boulder, Colorado, hoping to transform its start-up ecosystem through the 
accelerator model. Today, estimates of the number of accelerators range from 300+ to over 2000, 
spanning six continents. The number is growing rapidly. The TechStars program and its affiliates 
now operate in 11 cities, and the Global Accelerator Network, a selective international umbrella 
organization for accelerator programs who follow the TechStars model, counts 50 accelerators in 
63 cities on 6 continents among its members. 
Initially, many accelerator programs were generalist, accepting entrepreneurs whose 
businesses were directed at a variety of different industry verticals. Today, accelerator programs 
have also diversified into industry-vertical focused programs, such as Surge (Houston, TX) 
which focuses on acceleration of energy start-ups, Kaplan EdTech (New York, NY) which 
focuses on education-related start-ups, and Healthbox (Chicago and Boston) and Rock Health 
(San Francisco and Cambridge), which focus on acceleration of healthcare-related start-ups. 
Others specialize in a myriad of other fashions, for example, restricting applicants to those 
affiliated with a given community (women or minority-owned start-ups, or university-affiliated 
start-ups) or using or complementary to a particular company’s products (e.g. Microsoft or 
Nike). 
While proliferation of such innovation accelerators is evident, the efficacy of these 
programs is far from clear. Moreover, given the heterogeneity between programs, including the 
objectives of the programs themselves, it is likely that outcomes are also heterogeneous. Little 
research has explored whether these programs are effective, which ones are more effective and 
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what might drive results.  Indeed, even descriptive research on these programs is scant.   
Furthermore, the definition of accelerator programs remains discordant, which not only 
confuses the media and the marketplace but also complicates research, since researchers must 
manually categorize programs. For example, some programs with the word accelerator in their 
names are actually what we historically termed incubators – co-working spaces with shared 
resources and mentorship that is ad-hoc at best.  Heterogeneity between actual accelerator 
programs further complicates research in this area. It is therefore clear that research needs to go 
beyond simple inquiry and explore multiple drivers of multiple outcomes.  
Yet, research on the impact of accelerators has been anemic. There are several reasons for 
the lack of published research. In addition to the lack of comprehensive data sources mentioned 
above, the newness of the phenomena is also an issue. Not enough time has passed since the 
inception of many programs to assess outcomes, particularly since accelerators tend to focus on 
extremely early stage start-up ventures and most start-ups have graduated from accelerator 
programs within the last five years.  
In this paper, we provide a comprehensive set of characteristics that define accelerator 
programs as distinguished from other programs with similar or related goals. We then proceed to 
examine what is known and unknown about such programs from past research, and present 
summary statistics on a number of basic accelerator outcomes: (1) What proportion of 
accelerator graduates receive follow-on financing rounds? (2) What proportion of graduates have 
meaningful exits for founders? (3) How do programs differ in offerings, including mentorship 
and education? (4) What questions and data would be fruitful for informing further research and 
identification?  
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1. Defining the Seed Accelerator 
What do accelerators do? Broadly speaking, they help ventures define and build their initial 
products, identify promising customer segments, and secure resources, including capital and 
employees.  More specifically, accelerator programs are limited-duration programs—lasting 
roughly three months—that help cohorts of ventures with the new venture process. They usually 
provide a small amount of seed capital, plus working space. They also offer a plethora of 
networking, educational and mentorship opportunities, with both peer ventures and mentors, who 
might be successful entrepreneurs, program graduates, venture capitalists, angel investors, or 
even corporate executives.  Finally, most programs end with a grand event, usually a “demo day” 
where ventures pitch to a large audience of qualified investors (Cohen 2013).  
Certainly, much of this sounds familiar. After all, incubators and angel investors, which 
are more established phenomena, also help and fund nascent ventures. Accelerators certainly 
bear certain similarities to incubators and angel investors. Like the former, accelerators aim to 
help nascent ventures during the formation stage. We therefore might expect that many of the 
activities provided by incubators and angels would also be provided by accelerators. But 
accelerators differ in several ways. Perhaps the most fundamental difference is the limited 
duration of accelerator programs compared to the continuous nature of incubators and angel 
investments. This one small difference leads to many other differences, as we discuss in more 
detail below. We thus define the Seed Accelerator as follows:  
 
A fixed-term, cohort-based program, including mentorship and educational 
components, that culminates in a public pitch event or demo-day. 
 
Such programs may be for-profit or non-profit, and may vary in the amount of stipend, 
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the size of the equity stake taken, the length of the mentorship and educational program, the 
availability of co-working space and in industry vertical focus. Some are affiliated with venture 
capital firms or angel groups, some with corporations, and other with universities or local 
governments or non-governmental organizations. The fixed length of the program, its intensity, 
the provision of a stipend and services and the cohort-based nature of accelerator programs 
distinguishes them from other entities such as incubators, which lack a fixed term, do not 
typically provide equity investment in return for cash, primarily focus on co-working space and 
shared office resources (internet, etc.), are not selective in admissions, and offer ad-hoc 
educational offerings and mentoring if at all. 
  
2. Research on Seed Accelerators 
Given the newness of the accelerator phenomena, there is little published research on 
accelerators, and virtually no empirical research.  Initial reports describe accelerators (Caley and 
Kula 2013; Miller and Bound 2011) or compare accelerators to incubators (Isabelle 2013).  They 
suggest that the primary distinguishing features of accelerators are the limited duration of the 
programs, for-profit legal status and cohorts, or classes of start-ups who enter and graduate 
together.   
Some research highlights the role accelerators play in mediating the relationship between 
start-ups and investors. For example, Radojevich-Kelley and Hoffman’s (2012) multiple case 
study suggests that mentorship driven accelerator programs connect start-ups with potential 
investors, and Kim and Wagman’s (2012)  game theory model highlights accelerators’ role as 
certifiers of start-up quality. Kim and Wagman (2012), also raise an interesting tension: Since 
accelerators are investors in the ventures that they are certifying, they might be incentivized to 
withhold negative signals about participating start-ups. Overall, much of the existing research is 
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conceptual, lacking empirics (Isabelle 2013; Kim and Wagman 2012) or relying on a few case 
studies (Radojevich-Kelley and Hoffman 2012)1. 
Some exceptions to this include very recent, early-stage empirical studies such as Hallen, 
Bingham and Cohen (2013) and Winston-Smith and Hannigan (2013).  Both studies assess 
whether accelerators accelerate various aspects of startup company development. Hallen, 
Bingham and Cohen (2013) compare accelerated ventures that eventually raise venture capital to 
non-accelerated ventures that eventually raise venture capital. Their findings suggest that top 
programs do in fact accelerate the time horizon for reaching key milestones, including time to 
raising of venture capital, exit by acquisition and achievement of customer traction. However, 
they also find that many accelerator programs do not accelerate startup development.  Winston-
Smith and Hannigan (2013), in contrast, compare ventures that have participated in two of the 
leading accelerators, TechStars and YCombinator, to similar ventures that do not go through 
these programs but instead raise angel funding. Their findings suggest that, relative to startups 
that did not go through these programs, startups going through these two elite programs are 
founded by entrepreneurs from a relatively elite set of universities, receive their first round of 
follow-up financing significantly sooner and are more likely to be either acquired or to fail.   
 
3. Data Availability 
 
One of the primary obstacles to research in this area has been the absence of large scale 
representative datasets on accelerator programs that include program features and information 
about the companies which enter and graduate from the programs. Accelerator programs are 
typically lean organizations, with small staffs and little organized data collection. These 
                                                 
1 Multiple case study of 3 accelerators; not clear how many interviews.  
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programs are not tracked by commercial or government data providers. While some of the 
accelerators encourage their start-ups to submit some information to public databases like 
CrunchBase, not all do so consistently, as many start-ups want to keep funding data confidential 
(so as not to attract new entrants or reveal investor interest to potential competitors). Data is 
scraped from the internet and collected from other public sources from CrunchBase, and this 
publicly available data is aggregated at seed-db.com. However, the publicly available data lacks 
crucial detail and may not be complete. Moreover, it is difficult to ascertain whether the 
contributed data is representative or even accurate.  Few, if any, other data sources provide 
information that would speak to the quality and features of these programs.  
Some researchers, ourselves included, are therefore focused on assembling proprietary 
datasets to address issues of interest. For example, the Seed Accelerator Ranking Project (Gilani, 
and Quann (2011), Hochberg and Kamath (2012), Hochberg, Cohen, Fedher and Yee (2013)) 
collects data from nearly all U.S. accelerator programs with at least 10 graduates that take equity 
stakes in their startups, including detailed information on the features of each program, 
subsequent financing and exit outcomes from the program’s graduates, and qualitative 
assessments of the programs provided by in-depth interviews with a sample of venture capitalists 
and angel investors from across the U.S. as well as assessment of the programs by their 
graduates. Other collection efforts are focused on qualitative study of the phenomenon. For 
example, Cohen’s (Cohen 2013) embedded multiple case study of nine geographically dispersed 
and various sized U.S. accelerator programs combines funding data garnered from publically 
available databases with semi-structured interviews; archival data, such as blogs, company 
websites, and trade publications; and field observations to deduce how ventures accelerators 
accelerate the new venture process.  
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These datasets provide some initial insight into the features and heterogeneity of seed 
accelerator programs and outcomes for their graduates. Some key ranges and statistics are 
provided in Table 1. While many graduates of accelerator programs go on to receive seed, angel 
and VC financing within a year of completing the program, the variability is high. Furthermore, a 
relatively small proportion of accelerator graduates have successfully achieved exit for their 
founders; for many programs, no exits have been achieved. This may be due to the newness of 
these programs and the substantial period of time required for early stage companies to grow into 
viable M&A or IPO candidates.  
Table 1. 
Summary Statistics for Accelerator Programs from 2012 Seed Accelerator Rankings 
 Mean Range 
Stipend provided (in $ thousands) $22.89 $0 – 50 
Equity stake taken by accelerator in return for stipend 
and mentorship program 
6% 5-8% 
Percentage of graduates receiving subsequent 
financing of $350K or more within one year of 
graduation 
41% 5% - 78% 
Percentage of graduates who successfully exited via 
sale or IPO ($1M or more) as of  EoY 2011 
4% 0%-13% 
 
4. Distinguishing Accelerators from Incubators and Angels 
 
As noted, accelerators are often confused by the media, researchers and policy makers, with 
existing institutions such as incubators and angel or seed stage investors. Table 2 below provides 
a summary of the differences between incubators, angel investors, and accelerators, which we 
discuss in detail in this next section (Cohen, 2013). 
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Table 2. 
Summary of the Differences between Incubators, Investors, and Accelerators 
 
Accelerators Incubators Angel Investors 
Duration  3 months  1-5 yrs  Ongoing  
Cohorts  Yes  No  No  
Business model  Investment; non-profit Rent; non-profit  Investment  
Selection frequency  Competitive, cyclical  Non competitive  Competitive, ongoing  
Venture stage  Early  Early, or late  Early 
Education offered Seminars  Ad hoc, hr/legal  None  
Venture location  Usually on-site On-site Off-site 
Mentorship  Intense, by self and others  Minimal, tactical  As needed, by investor  
 
4.1 Accelerators versus Incubators 
Even prior to the rise of seed accelerators, groups that provided shared workspace, ad hoc 
mentoring and services, known as incubators, had proliferated across the US. Perhaps one of the 
best known of these incubators, prominent during the internet bubble of the late 1990’s, was Bill 
Gross’ idealabs. According to the National Business Incubation Association, incubators shelter 
vulnerable nascent businesses, allowing them to become stronger before becoming independent. 
The association’s website2 reports that 93 percent of all incubators are non-profit organizations 
focused on economic development, and roughly a third are affiliated with a university.   
 In general, tenant firms pay reduced rent to incubators in exchange for office space and 
administrative support services (Allen and McCluskey 1990).  Incubator managers may also 
introduce firms to financiers, and legal, technology transfer, and accounting consultants(Hackett 
and Dilts 2004). University-affiliated incubators may also transfer intellectual property from 
faculty members to firms that are commercializing the university’s intellectual property.  
 Philosophically, incubators are designed to nurture nascent ventures by buffering them 
from the environment, providing them room to grow in a space sheltered from market forces. 
                                                 
2 http://www.nbia.org/resource_library/faq/#4 
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Accelerators, in contrast, are designed to speed up market interactions in order to help nascent 
ventures adapt quickly and learn. Practically, accelerators differ from incubators on four 
important dimensions. 
 
A. Duration 
The limited duration of accelerators, usually three months, is the characteristic that most clearly 
defines accelerator programs.  Research on incubators suggests that firms graduate from 
incubators anywhere from one to five years after they begin (Amezcua, 2011). Established 
timelines and strict graduation dates reduce the amount of codependence between ventures and 
accelerators and force ventures to face the selection mechanisms that operate in the market. 
Participating in an accelerator program may not necessarily keep the venture (or the venture 
idea) alive; instead, it may speed up the cycle of the venture—leading to quicker growth or 
quicker failure. Quicker failure does have a benefit if those entrepreneurs move on to a higher-
value opportunity: they can help grow different ventures and the overall economy. The limited 
duration of accelerator programs focuses founders’ attention. Founders work at an often 
unsustainable pace for the three-month programs; often working seven days a week, doing little 
else but work and sleep. Of course, they could not sustain this pace if the programs were longer 
or ongoing. 
 
B. Cohorts 
Another byproduct of the structured, limited-duration programs of accelerators is that ventures 
enter and exit the programs in groups, known as cohorts or batches.  While venture founders in 
an incubator may also develop relationships with other founders at the incubator, the experience 
of starting in the program at the same time fosters uncommonly strong bonds and communal 
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identity between founders in the same accelerator cohort.  The batching selection process also 
focuses the accelerator’s marketing and outreach around key dates. Moreover, the open 
application process attracts ventures from a wide, even global, pool. Top accelerator programs 
accept as few as one percent of applicants.   
 
 
C. Incentives 
Many accelerators are privately owned3, and take an equity stake in the ventures participating in 
the programs4. Incubators, on the other hand, are mostly publicly owned, managed by managers, 
and generally do not have their own investment funds (Allen and McCluskey, 1990; Hackett and 
Dilts, 2004). As a result, the incentives of accelerator directors are often more closely aligned 
with the ventures than are those of professional incubator managers. Further, some accelerator 
owners have extensive experience as entrepreneurs or angel investors, giving them the first-hand 
experience they need to assist ventures with a myriad of tasks, from customer development to 
fundraising and hiring. Accelerators typically seek growth that leads to a positive exit, while the 
best outcome for an incubator might be slower growth, which delays graduation and prolongs the 
venture’s tenant status. It is telling that ventures in incubators are called tenants while those 
affiliated with accelerators are called portfolio companies--consistent with the fact that most 
accelerators take equity stakes in participating firms.  
 
D. Educational Program  
Intense mentorship and education are cornerstones of accelerator programs and often a primary 
reason that ventures participate. Research on incubators (Hackett and Dilts, 2004) suggests that 
                                                 
3 Recent years have seen the emergence of publically backed accelerators, of which more and more are being 
formed.  
4 Less frequently, accelerators are non-profit organizations and offer stipends rather than equity investments. 
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incubators offer fee-based professional services, such as accountants and lawyers. Education at 
accelerators, however, appears to be extensive, and often includes seminars on a wide range of 
entrepreneurship topics, including unit economics, search engine optimization, and term sheet 
negotiation. Such seminars are usually given by either the directors of the program or by guest 
speakers who often provide one-on-one guidance after their talks.   
 
E. Mentorship & Network Development.  
Mentorship is also frequently cited as a valuable aspect of accelerator programs, but it varies 
quite substantially among programs. Some programs schedule meetings with up to 75 different 
mentors during their first month. Others may either make introductions on an as-needed basis, or 
simply hand entrepreneurs a list of pre-selected mentors. Meeting with four or five mentors a day 
for nearly a month provides a unique opportunity for ventures to build their social network and 
learn about alternate strategies. Generally, network development is cited as an important aspect 
of accelerator participation. Finally, managing directors provide guidance throughout the 
program, helping entrepreneurs understand the knowledge they are garnering through mentor 
meetings, seminars, and other means.  
 
4.2 Accelerators versus Angels 
 
Angel investors also aim to help fledging ventures, primarily financially through investment. 
Angels are individual investors who provide seed capital investments and varying amounts of 
advice to young firms. Often, but not always, they are entrepreneurs who want to help the next 
generation of entrepreneurs. They also may be friends or family members who provide financial 
investment  (Feld and Mendelson 2011). More recently, platforms such as AngelList have been 
formed to facilitate matching between entrepreneurs and angel investors.  
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While accelerators are often compared to incubators, they are may be more similar to 
angel investors.  The entrepreneurs who participated in the authors’ research concur. While none 
of them considered applying to incubators, nearly all either tried, or planned, to raise seed capital 
from angel investors. Moreover, while none of the accelerator founders we spoke to had prior 
experience running incubators, nearly all were active angel investors.  Angel investors differ 
from accelerators in three key ways.   
   
A. Duration  
Paradoxically, the limited duration of accelerator programs increases the influence programs 
have on portfolio ventures, compared to the influence of other early-stage investors.  Because 
they make investments in batches, accelerator directors spend more time with ventures. They 
dedicate three months to helping a batch of young firms, and then move on to the next batch. 
This focused and highly structured time with young startup teams influences the direction of the 
portfolio companies while they are still malleable. The limited duration of programs also helps 
assemble mentors, guest speakers, and other resources for the ventures. External supporters, like 
mentors, can more easily commit to the ventures since the program is short. The limited duration 
also forces ventures to graduate at a pre-specified time. Graduations are marked by “demo days” 
where venture founders pitch their businesses to large audiences of potential investors. Again, 
the structured duration of the program enables the accelerators to periodically assemble 
impressive groups of local, regional, and other investors. It is unlikely that individual angel 
investors could assemble such impressive groups, or attract the same level of media attention.  
Overall, accelerators’ time-compressed programs and social norms encourage frequent dialog 
between accelerator directors and participating ventures, and encourage ventures to learn and 
adapt. 
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B. Business Model and Selection  
One of the most difficult aspects of angel and venture capital investing is selecting the most 
promising ventures from groups of early-stage companies. The accelerator format helps angels 
and venture capital funds select firms by combining the funds of many investors, enabling 
accelerators to spread risk across more portfolio firms. Thus accelerators hedge their bets and 
increase their odds of picking a home run. Moreover, accelerator fund investors can, and often 
do, increase their investments in their favorite firm’s post-accelerator program. Thus, the 
accelerator serves as a deal aggregator, and provides a real option for investors who learn about a 
batch of ventures before taking a larger financial stake in them.  
 
C. Education, Mentorship, and Colocation  
Another challenge for angel investors is being able to influence the strategic direction of 
portfolio companies. Angel investors might have a seat on the board and meet with their 
portfolio firms periodically to mentor their portfolio firms directly. They typically do not co-
locate with portfolio companies.  In contrast, accelerator directors work alongside their 
participating ventures and connect them with mentors, including investors and active or former 
entrepreneurs. Moreover, when ventures raise seed funds from multiple investors, it may become 
difficult to get all parties to agree to change strategic direction. The accelerator model, however, 
provides significant amounts of education, mentoring, and advice throughout the program. It also 
encourages and accepts change. 
  
5. Conclusion 
Accelerator programs represent a relatively new model of assistance for entrepreneurs 
that combines many features that in the past were typically provided separately. They differ 
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significantly from previously known models such as incubators, angel investors and co-working 
environments. These differences are thought to have significant importance for the ultimate 
success of their graduates.  While rigorous research in the area so far is limited, the accelerator 
model represents an interesting area for further exploration of what affects the success of startup 
ventures, and recent data collection efforts may aid in providing an opportunity for deeper 
qualitative and quantitative analysis. 
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